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FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A ROADMAP FOR THE
APPLICATION OF TRIBAL LAW IN STATE COURTS
Jackie Gardina*
Abstract
This article contends that state courts are not necessarily free to apply state
law when the courts are exercising concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction with
tribal courts. Instead, Indian law principles of preemption direct state courts
to apply tribal law in certain cases. A guiding principle emerges from the
preemption analysis: if a tribe has legislative jurisdiction over the dispute,
tribal law must ordinarily be applied. In these instances, a state's laws,
including its choice-of-law rules, are preempted by federal common law
because their application interferes with the federal government's and the
tribes' interest in promoting tribal self-government, including the tribes' ability
to create laws and have those laws applied to disputes over which they have
jurisdiction. This article differs in a significant respect from other articles
addressing the application of tribal law in state courts. Some commentators
have argued that state courts should incorporate tribal law into their traditional
choice-of-law analysis. While this argument is certainly viable, it fails to
recognize the primacy of tribal law and tribal interests in certain instances.
The forum bias inherent in state choice-of-law rules provides limited
protection to tribes' sovereignty interest. To the extent that the states' choice-
of-law rules can be bypassed, they should be.
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Introduction
Jurisdiction in the tribal context is far from a settled area of law.' But while
courts and commentators have opined extensively on the respective roles of
states and tribes in adjudicating disputes that arise in Indian Country, little
attention has been paid to what law should be applied once the proper forum
has been selected.2 This lack of attention has led to a troubling intrusion on
tribal sovereignty. Under the current jurisdictional landscape, state courts can
and are exercising concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction over suits that could
properly be heard in tribal court, and, often without discussion, applying state
law to the dispute.' State courts improperly presume that the authority to issue
an order (adjudicative jurisdiction) brings with it the concomitant authority to
apply state law to the dispute (legislative jurisdiction).' As a result, tribal
jurisdiction (both adjudicative and legislative) and, by extension, tribal
sovereignty, is being usurped.
A case heard in New Mexico provides an apt example of this problem. In
Wacondo v. Concha,' two plaintiffs, one a member of the Zia Pueblo and the
other a member of the Jemez Pueblo, sued the defendant, a member of the
Taos Pueblo, in state court for injuries associated with a shooting on the Jemez
Pueblo.' The state court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the dispute while also acknowledging that the Jemez tribal court had
1. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (describing the limits
of state authority in Indian Country); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978)
(recognizing the plenary authority of the federal government in Indian Country); Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,336-37 (2008) (defining the
limits of tribal jurisdiction); David M. Blurton, ANCSA Corporation Lands and the Dependent
Indian Community Category of Indian Country, 13 ALASKA L. REv. 211, 227-28 (1996)
(describing the shifting policies).
2. Katherine C. Pearson, Departing from the Routine: Application ofIndian Tribal Law
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 32 ARiz. ST. L.J. 695, 725 (2000).
3. See infra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
5. 873 P.2d 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
6. Id. at 277.
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jurisdiction as well.' Despite recognizing that both the tribal and state courts
had adjudicative jurisdiction, the court gave only passing comment to the
applicable law, stating that it does not find that "the provision of a state
remedy, in this limited context, will in any way inhibit the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them."'
The state court's pronouncement is stunning in both its breadth and its
brevity. Not only did the state court determine that it had concurrent
adjudicative jurisdiction over a case between Indians that occurred in Indian
territory, but it also determined that it had legislative jurisdiction as well,
applying state law without discussion.9 Under this approach, a litigant can
avoid both the reach of the tribal court and the application of tribal law simply
by filing in state court. But perhaps more importantly, the state court's
assumption of jurisdiction severely intrudes on the involved tribe's
sovereignty.
The state court's error is understandable given the confused jurisdictional
landscape in Indian law and the Supreme Court's apparent mistrust of tribal
law."o Within the tribal context, the Supreme Court has treated the tribes'
legislative jurisdiction and the tribal courts' adjudicative jurisdiction as
essentially coterminous." Unfortunately, state courts have followed the
Supreme Court's lead by folding the legislative jurisdiction question into the
adjudicative jurisdiction question when considering the reach of their own
authority.12 Consequently, state courts have blindly applied state law to cases
in which they share adjudicative jurisdiction with tribal courts, failing to
consider whether they have the authority to do so. To add to the problem, the
Court has cast tribal law as wholly foreign and obscure, implicitly encouraging
tribal law to be relegated to tribal courts."
7. Id. at 280 n.3.
8. Id. at 280.
9. Id.
10. See Blurton, supra note 1, at 227-28; Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 336-37 (2008); see also infra notes 52-81 and accompanying text.
11. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
12. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
13. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (quoting Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (asserting that non-Indians should not be subject to
tribal laws because it would "impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code
... which judges them by a standard made by others, and not for them ... [and] tries them, not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a
different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect
conception")).
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This article contends that state courts exercising concurrent adjudicative
jurisdiction - like the Waconda court - lack the authority to apply state law.
Instead, Indian law principles of preemption direct state courts to apply tribal
law in certain cases.14 A guiding principle emerges: if a tribe has jurisdiction
over the dispute, tribal law must ordinarily be applied. In these instances, a
state's laws, including its choice-of-law rules, are preempted by federal
common law because their application interferes with the federal government's
and the tribes' interest in promoting the tribes' authority to create laws and to
have those laws applied to disputes over which they have jurisdiction.
Requiring state courts to apply tribal law is by no means a radical idea.
Congress has already created a statutory framework that recognizes that a state
court may have adjudicative jurisdiction but lack the authority to apply its own
law to the underlying dispute.16 The Supreme Court has also concluded that
there are instances when a state court may be required to apply tribal law."
Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that while a state's jurisdiction may
at times extend into Indian Country, it is subordinate to the federal
government's and tribes' interest in promoting and maintaining tribal self-
government.' 8
This contention is nonetheless likely to raise objections. Some
commentators have argued that state courts should not apply tribal law.' The
concerns expressed are based both on practical considerations and concern for
the continued vitality of tribal courts and tribal law. To be sure, there are
practical difficulties with the application of tribal law by state court judges.
Tribal law is not necessarily codified or easily accessible, is often interpreted
based on the traditions of the tribe, and tribal judges are sometimes allowed to
consult tribal elders as to the laws' meaning - a concept foreign to state court
judges.20 There are historical concerns as well. Some commentators fear that
a state court's application of tribal law will perpetuate the assimilation process
14. See infra notes 210-41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 210-41 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), (c) (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 233, 1322(c) (2006); see also
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001).
17. See Three Affiliated Tribes ofFort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,
890 (1986) (Wold 1l).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., John J. Harte, Comment, Validity of State Court's Exercise of Concurrent
Jurisdiction Over CivilActions Arising in Indian Country: Application oftheIndian Abstention
Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 63, 91 (1997); Christine Zuni, Strengthening
What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 27 (1997).
20. Harte, supra note 19, at 91-92.
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and result in laws that reflect the values of the dominant culture and not
necessarily those of the affected tribe.2 1 Moreover, the state courts' authority
to apply tribal law may fuel the argument that tribal courts are unnecessary.22
While these concerns are certainly valid, they ignore the reality of the
current jurisdictional landscape. The state courts can and are exercising
concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction over suits that touch on tribes' sovereignty
interest.23 While this practice allows a litigant to reject the jurisdiction of the
tribal courts, it should not allow the litigant to likewise avoid the application
of tribal law. If the state courts are free to ignore tribal law, the assertion of
tribal sovereignty will be dependent upon a litigant's forum selection.
Requiring state courts to apply tribal law will ensure that tribal authority is
being recognized even when the tribes' courts are not accessed.
Moreover, many of the practical concerns noted above can be easily
overcome. First, tribal laws are not necessarily foreign concepts shrouded in
mystery. Many tribes rely on principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence
familiar to state courts or have adopted state law to fill gaps in their tribal
codes.24 In other instances, the state courts could certify difficult questions to
the tribal courts, allowing tribal judges to aid in the interpretation and
application of the tribes' laws.25 Tribal councils could also codify their
customs and traditions to make them more accessible, and tribal courts could
more consistently publish their judicial opinions to guide state court judges.
And while it is certainly true that state court judges could "anglicize" tribal
law, it may also be true that Indian customs and traditions could influence the
development of state laws.
Part I sets the stage for the state courts' confusion regarding the application
of tribal law in state courts. It first explores the adjudicative and legislative
jurisdiction of the state courts outside the tribal context. It then discusses the
21. Cf Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings ofthe Family,
79 NEB. L. REV. 577, 579 (2000) (discussing the tribal courts' responsibility to weave cultural
values into the law as a consequence of non-Indian court systems replacing tribal values).
22. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How
the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 235, 281 (1997).
23. See infra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
24. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L.REV. 285, 315-16 (1998); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Towarda Theory
ofIntertribal and Intratribal Common Law, 43 Hous. L. REv. 701, 726 (2006).
25. COHEN'SHANDBOOKOFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW 653,654 & n.446 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
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well-established analytical framework employed by state courts to address
these two distinct jurisdictional questions.
Next, it examines these same jurisdictional questions in the tribal courts,
revealing how the Supreme Court has wrought confusion by collapsing the
adjudicative and legislative jurisdictional inquiries. It also highlights the link
between tribal jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty to emphasize that when the
former is ignored, the latter is usurped. Finally, this section challenges the two
widely held beliefs that have influenced Indian jurisdictional law: first, that
tribal law is based on foreign concepts that are difficult to ascertain, and
second, that tribal courts only apply tribal law to disputes.
Part II describes the wide-ranging circumstances in which a state court and
tribal court may share adjudicative jurisdiction. This section distinguishes
between a state court's authority to assume jurisdiction by congressional fiat
and a state court's assumption of jurisdiction based on a theory of inherent
sovereignty, questioning the scope of the latter. It goes on to explore and
critique the state courts' failure to consider the scope of their legislative
jurisdiction in the absence of a congressional mandate and the effect that the
application of state law has on the tribes' sovereignty interest.
Finally, Part III contends that when tribes have legislative jurisdiction,
federal law directs state courts to apply tribal law unless Congress has
mandated a different outcome. This section discusses the unique preemption
analysis present in the Indian law context and argues that state law is
preempted by federal common law. Under this rubric, state courts are not free
to apply state law - or even their choice-of-law rules - when a tribe's
jurisdiction, and thus its sovereignty interest, is implicated.
L Jurisdiction of State and Tribal Courts
The state courts' failure to apply tribal law is perhaps unsurprising given the
warped jurisdictional landscape created in the Indian law context. In theory,
the jurisdictional inquiries are the same regardless of whether the parties file
in state or tribal court.26 A court must answer two distinct questions: does it
have adjudicative jurisdiction and does it have legislative jurisdiction? 27 In the
26. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815 (1985) (distinguishing between
adjudicative and legislativejurisdiction in the state courts); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 373-
74 (2001) ("And the second problem is that withoutfirst determining whether the tribe has
regulatory jurisdiction, it is impossible to know which 'immunity defenses' the federal court is
supposed to consider. The tribe's law on this subject need not be the same as the State's.").
27. See Shutts, 472 U.S at 815-16 (distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative
jurisdiction in the state courts).
[Vol. 3 56
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tribal court context, the Supreme Court has collapsed these two inquiries,
setting the stage for the present confusion regarding the scope of the state
courts' authority to apply state law to a dispute over which the tribal courts
have jurisdiction.28
As a general matter, jurisdiction is the authority of a state, tribe, or other
governmental body to exercise power over people and property.29 Jurisdiction
can be broken down into legislative jurisdiction (the government's general
power to regulate conduct)"o and adjudicative jurisdiction (the power of a
government's court to decide a case or impose an order)." Adjudicative
jurisdiction can be further categorized into personal jurisdiction (the power of
the court to issue a binding judgment against a defendant)" and subject matter
jurisdiction (the authority of a court to hear a particular issue).33  These
jurisdictional definitions remain constant regardless of whether a party has
filed a case in state court, federal court, or tribal court. More importantly,
courts have recognized these jurisdictional concepts as independent of one
another, each requiring a distinct analysis.34 Yet, as will be discussed more
28. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (treating a tribe's legislative
and adjudicative jurisdiction as coterminous).
29. Although the relationship among the federal, state, and tribal governments in the United
States is not itself dictated by international law, the categories ofjurisdiction described therein
are analogous to the separation of powers and federalism principles inherent in the United States
Constitution, and domestic law is generally construed to conform with international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 cmts. a-c
(1987). Thus, while the categories of power are the same in the domestic context, the
constraints on that power are imposed by constitutional, statutory, and decisional law, rather
than international law.
30. See Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587 (1978)
(defining legislative jurisdiction as "the power of a state to apply its law to create or affect legal
interests").
31. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2(1999).
32. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citations omitted).
33. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Am., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
34. Adjudicatory or judicial jurisdiction is defined as "the power of a state to try a
particular action in its courts." McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 581 n.3
(8th Cir.) (emphasis omitted), affd, 454 U.S. 1071 (1981); see also Tallentire v. Offshore
Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1284 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing legislativejurisdiction
fromjudicial jurisdiction), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 816 (1985), rev'don other grounds, 477 U.S.
207 (1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 cmt. a (1934) ("Each state has
legislative jurisdiction [i.e., power] to determine the legal effect of acts done or events caused
within its territory.")). Justice Scalia, dissenting in part in HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. Calfornia,
509 U.S. 764 (1993), stressed that legislative jurisdiction "refers to 'the authority of a state to
No. 1]1 7
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fully below, these jurisdictional concepts have been blended in the tribal
context, creating confusion and wreaking havoc on tribal sovereignty.
A. State Court Jurisdiction
Outside the tribal context, there are few impediments to a state's
adjudicative jurisdiction. As to the scope of their adjudicative jurisdiction,
state courts are understood to be courts of "general jurisdiction," limited only
by state legislative prohibitions," Congress's decision that certain issues
belong exclusively in the federal or tribal courts,36 and by the federal
Constitution." As a result of these broad parameters, multiple states may have
the authority to hear and issue a binding judgment in the same suit.
A state's legislative jurisdiction outside the tribal context is expansive as
well, constrained only by the federal Constitution." While several
constitutional provisions have possible relevance to jurisdictional questions,
the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause are the two most
frequently cited. Under these provisions, a state must have a significant
contact or aggregation of contacts "such that application of its law [is] neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."" Essentially, a state must establish an
interest in the underlying dispute before it can constitutionally apply its law to
the case.40 As with adjudicative jurisdiction, more than one state may have the
authority to regulate the conduct at issue.41
Despite the similarities in scope, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the adjudicative and legislative jurisdictional inquiries are distinct and that the
make its law applicable to persons or activities,' and is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction
to adjudicate."' Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
35. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990).
36. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) ("This deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of course, rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts
the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.").
37. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102,108 (1987) ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to exert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
38. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (discussing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (discussing the Due
Process Clause).
39. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320.
40. See id.
41. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 727 ("[B]ut since the legislative jurisdictions of the States
overlap, it is frequently the case under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully
apply either the law of one State or the contrary law of another.").
[Vol. 358
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presence of one does not guarantee the existence of the other. In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court held that while a Kansas state court could
adjudicate the underlying dispute, it could not, consistent with the federal
Constitution, apply Kansas law.42 In Shutts, three plaintiffs, oil lessors,
brought a nationwide class-action suit in Kansas state court against Phillips
and other oil lessees for interest on royalty payments allegedly due.43 While
the Court found that Kansas could assert personal jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, it determined that Kansas
lacked a constitutionally sufficient interest in all the claims to apply Kansas
state law." Shutts makes clear that adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction are
not coterminous concepts. A state court may have the power to hear a case but
lack the authority to apply its law to the dispute.
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Tribal jurisdiction differs from state jurisdiction in four important ways.
First, tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over certain disputes between
members, 45 but almost no power over non-Indians.46 Second, a tribe's
jurisdiction is subject entirely to congressional control.47 Third, a tribe's
adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction are quite limited. 48 Fourth, a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction is (currently) coextensive with its legislative
jurisdiction; if a tribe cannot regulate a particular activity, the tribal courts are
unable to hear a related claim.49 The Supreme Court has also incorrectly
assumed a fifth distinction - that tribal courts do not engage in a choice-of-law
analysis and instead will apply tribal law to disputes over which the tribal
42. 472 U.S. 797, 814, 823 (1985) (holding that the court properly asserted personal
jurisdiction over the parties and that Kansas could not apply Kansas law to all the transactions
at issue in the suit).
43. Id. at 799.
44. Id. at 814, 823.
45. Cf Fisher v. Dist. Ct. of Sixteenth Jud. Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (per
curiam).
46. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
47. Id. at 545-46.
48. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (1997) (rejecting the premise that "tribal
courts are courts of 'general jurisdiction"'); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453
(1997); Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
49. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 357-58 (stating that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction").
No. I] 9
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courts have jurisdiction.o In fact, the limits on the tribal courts adjudicative
jurisdiction appear to be driven in part by this conclusion.s"
1. Adjudicative and Legislative Jurisdiction
While the source of tribal powers of self-governance stems from a
combination of tribal and federal law, its practical reach is constrained by
limits imposed by federal law.52 Tribal sovereignty does not mimic the
sovereignty retained by the states in our federal system of government.
According to the Supreme Court, "the sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain
is of a unique and limited character ... and is subject to complete defeasance"
by Congress.53
Tribal jurisdiction is understood only to encompass what is deemed
"necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations."54
Based on this understanding, the Supreme Court has recognized that the tribes'
inherent sovereignty, and thus their jurisdiction, includes the authority to
govern "their members and their territory."55 As incident to this jurisdiction,
the Court has held that tribes have the authority "to punish tribal offenders, .
. . to determine tribal membership, regulate domestic relations among tribe
members, and to prescribe rules for the inheritance of property."" Tribes also
have the authority to exclude others from tribal property and to regulate
activities on land owned and controlled by the tribe."
As a general rule, however, tribal jurisdiction does not include the power to
regulate or adjudicate the conduct of nonmembers of the tribe. In Montana
v. United States, the Court recognized two exceptions to this general
proposition." The first exception recognizes that the tribe may regulate "the
50. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337
(2008) (citations omitted); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring).
51. The Court is reluctant to subject non-Indians to laws with which they are unfamiliar,
thus it limits a tribal court's adjudicativejurisdiction to protect non-Indians from tribal law. See
Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (Souter,
J., concurring).
52. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896).
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
54. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
55. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)).
56. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 & n.18 (citations omitted).
57. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
425-26 (1989).
58. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
59. Id. at 565-66.
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activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements." 60 The second exception allows a tribe to regulate "the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within [the] reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."6' The Court has narrowly
construed these two exceptions, requiring a close nexus between the disputed
conduct and the preservation of the involved tribe's sovereignty interest. 62
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long
Family Land & Cattle Co. provides a potent example of the limitations of the
tribes' jurisdictional reach. In Plains Commerce Bank, Ronnie and Lila Long,
enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Tribe, complained that
Plains Commerce Bank had "discriminated against them by offering the land
to non-Indians on terms more favorable than those the bank offered to them."
The Longs owned a cattle company located on over two thousand acres of fee
land in Indian Country and were struggling to meet their debt obligations to
the Bank.64 They attempted to restructure the debt, deeding their land to the
Bank for the cancellation of debt, additional operating loans, and a two-year
lease agreement with an option to buy.65 Unfortunately, the Longs were
unable to exercise the option to purchase the property and the Bank sold the
land to several nonmembers, but on terms significantly better than what they
had offered to the Longs.
The Longs filed suit in tribal court "seeking an injunction to prevent their
eviction from the property and to reverse the sale of the land. They asserted
a variety of claims, including . . . discrimination."6 ' The tribal courts, the
federal district court, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals all agreed that
the Bank was subject to tribal jurisdiction because it had entered a consensual
commercial relationship with the Longs - tribal members who own and
operate the Long Company.68
60. Id. at 565.
61. Id. at 566.
62. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 334-36
(2008) (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 320.
64. Id. at 320-21.
65. Id. at 321.
66. Id. at 322.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 323.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to
hear the Long's discrimination case because the tribe lacked legislative
jurisdiction over the Bank's sale of its fee land.69 The Court did not find that
the Bank's consensual relationship with tribal members was sufficient to
subject it to tribal regulation. The Court acknowledged that tribal laws "may
be fairly imposed on nonmembers" if they consented either explicitly or
through their conduct, but went on to note that "[e]ven then, the regulation
must stem from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on
entry, preserve tribal self-government, or control internal relations."70 Because
the Court framed the dispute as one about the Bank's sale of fee-owned land
properly in its possession rather than the Bank's course of dealing with the
Longs, it did not find that the sale implicated tribal sovereignty and,
consequently, tribal jurisdiction was not triggered."
The Court went on to address whether the Bank's conduct implicated the
second Montana exception by threatening or having "some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."72 The Court described this exception as one where the non-Indian
conduct "must 'imperil the subsistence' of the tribal community" or where the
assertion of tribal authority "must be necessary to avert catastrophic
consequences." 73 The Court then found that while the sale of formerly Indian-
owned land might be "disappointing" to the tribe, it was not "catastrophic" to
its existence.74 As a result, the Montana exceptions were not met and the tribe
was without authority to regulate the Bank's conduct.
While the Montana exceptions were created in the context of a case
defining the limits of a tribe's legislative jurisdiction, the Court, in Strate v. A-
1 Contractors, declared that the exceptions apply with equal force to a tribal
court's adjudicative jurisdiction. Under this admonition, a tribal court's
adjudicative jurisdiction will not exist in the absence of a tribe's legislative
69. Id. at 340-41 (citations omitted). The Longs other claims were not before the Court and
the Court declined to speculate whether the tribal court could assert jurisdiction over the other
claims. Id. at 339 & n.2.
70. Id. at 337 (citation omitted).
71. See id. at 337-38 (citations omitted).
72. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
73. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341 (citation omitted).
74. Id
75. See 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
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jurisdiction. The Court, however, left open the question whether the tribe's
legislative jurisdiction may be broader than its adjudicative jurisdiction.7
Consequently, under the Court's jurisprudence, a tribe can assert legislative
and adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers only when doing so is
necessary to preserve the tribe's sovereignty over its members and its property
or when assertion of its authority is critical to its very existence." It is only in
these narrow circumstances that a tribal court can properly apply tribal law to
the dispute. If the tribe's sovereignty is not at issue, the tribe "has no
interest" in regulating the conduct in dispute.o If the tribe has no legislative
jurisdiction, its courts cannot adjudicate the underlying dispute." Under this
paradigm, a tribe's jurisdiction - both legislative and adjudicative - is tied to
its ability to self-govern, as it is only when its sovereignty is implicated that
its jurisdiction is triggered.
2. Tribal Law
Without discussion, both the Supreme Court and scholars have assumed that
tribal law is applied to cases heard in tribal court.82 Indeed, it is this
assumption that appears to underlie, at least in part, the limitations on tribal
courts' jurisdiction.8 ' The Court accepts, without supporting authority, that
tribal courts will automatically apply tribal law to disputes involving
nonmembers and that the content of tribal law is dramatically different from
the laws the litigants would be subject to in state or federal courts.84 Because
nonmembers cannot participate in tribal government and influence the laws
76. Id.
77. See id. The Court did not declare that a tribe's legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction
were coextensive. Instead, the Court stated that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction." This phrasing leaves open the possibility that a tribe's
legislative jurisdiction may in fact be broader than its adjudicative authority.
78. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 334-37 (citations omitted).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 335 ("While tribes generally have no interest in regulating the conduct of
nonmembers, then, they may regulate nonmember behavior that implicates tribal governance
and internal relations.").
81. Strate, 450 U.S. at 453.
82. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted) (assuming without
discussion that tribal law will be applied if the case is heard in tribal court); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); COHEN, supra note 25, at 652.
83. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted); Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
84. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 337 (citations omitted); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-
85 (Souter, J., concurring).
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and regulations that apply in tribal territory, the Court has severely restricted
the tribes' jurisdictional reach over nonmembers."
The Court has never entertained the possibility of untangling legislative
jurisdiction from adjudicative jurisdiction within the tribal context as it has in
the state courts. Instead, the Court wedded the two concepts, allowing its
assumptions regarding the application of tribal law, as well as its beliefs about
the laws' content, to dictate the existence of the tribes' legislative and
adjudicative jurisdiction. The Court's one-dimensional approach fails to
recognize the competency of tribal courts to engage in a choice-of-law analysis
and similarly fails to explore the contours of tribal law. It also sets the stage
for state courts' unwillingness to apply tribal law to disputes in which the state
and tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 6 The state courts' resistance to
applying tribal law is especially troubling given the Supreme Court's emphasis
on the link between tribal sovereignty and tribal jurisdiction. By assuming
concurrent adjudicativejurisdiction and ignoring tribal law, the state courts are
infringing upon tribal sovereignty.
The Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks provides an example of the
assumptions made regarding application of tribal law to an underlying dispute.
There, the tribe member brought an action in tribal court alleging that state
officials acted improperly when they entered his property to execute a search
warrant." He brought "causes of action [that] included trespass to land and
chattels, abuse of process," and a § 1983 claim for "violation of [his] civil
rights.""
Although the issue had originally been presented as one regarding the tribal
court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court limited its discussion to whether
the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes had legislative jurisdiction over the case,
noting that if legislative jurisdiction was lacking, adjudicative jurisdiction was
as well.89 Ultimately, the Court held that the assertion of tribal authority was
"not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations" and thus the tribe
lacked both legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction.90 The Court's conclusion
was based in part on the assumption that the tribal court would apply tribal law
85. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted).
86. See infra notes 190-209 and accompanying text; see also LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16
("Adjudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law-making
authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.").
87. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356.
88. Id. at 356-57; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
89. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 357-58.
90. Id. at 364.
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to the dispute.9' Indeed, the majority identified the relevant issue in dispute as
"whether the Tribe's law will apply, not to their own members, but to a narrow
category of outsiders." 92
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas in concurrence,
gave voice to the underlying concerns about applying tribal law to
nonmembers, noting that tribal courts "differ from other American courts . .
in the substantive law they apply."93
Although some modem tribal courts "mirror American courts" and
"are guided by written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines,"
tribal law is still frequently unwritten, being based instead "on the
values, mores, and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs,
traditions, and practices," and is often "handed down orally or by
example from one generation to another." The resulting law
applicable in tribal courts is a complex "mix of tribal codes and
federal, state, and traditional law, which would be unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out."94
The Plains Commerce Bank Court picked up the concern expressed by the
concurrence in Hicks when it noted that a tribe's jurisdiction required the
consent of the nonmember because nonmembers "have no say in the laws and
regulations that govem tribal territory.""
The Court's assumptions are not grounded in reality. Like their state court
counterparts, tribal judges do engage in a choice-of-law analysis." Tribal
courts understand that the jurisdictional issue is distinct from the choice-of-law
question. 97 Many tribal codes have explicit choice-of-law rules that contain a
hierarchy of laws that must either be applied to a dispute or that offer a list of
appropriate persuasive authority in the absence of explicit tribal law.98 But
91. Id. at 371.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
95. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
96. Many tribal codes provide a choice-of-law hierarchy. See, e.g., CONFEDERATED SALISH
AND KOOTENAI TRIBES LAWS CODIFIED § 4-1-104 (2003); SISSETON-WAHPETON TRIBAL CODE
§ 33-01-1 (1996), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/sissetonwahpeton%20code/sw
civilmats.htm.
97. See Sells v. Espil, No. A-CV-15-89, 42 (Navajo Aug. 14, 1990) (VersusLaw)
[subscription only] ("The determination that the Navajo court has jurisdiction [] has no bearing
on choice of law matters.").
98. See, e.g., CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES LAWS CODIFIED § 4-1-104;
SISSETON-WAHPETON TRIBAL CODE § 33-01-1.
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even in instances where the application of tribal law is mandated by an explicit
tribal code provision, tribal courts will still apply state law when appropriate."
For example, tribal courts will abide by contractual provisions requiring
application of foreign law."oo
Moreover, tribal law is simply not the foreign concept Justice Souter
suggests. The Court fails to even acknowledge that the federal government
mandated and approved tribal constitution and code provisions."' As a result,
many tribal codes mimic the statutory text of state codes. 0 2 Even tribal courts
recognize the influence of state and federal laws on their own laws."'3 As
noted by one tribal court, the tribe's "statutes are largely the product of Anglo-
European legal thinking and drafting, and they are frequently based upon
legislative models found in state and federal legislation. That being the case,
state cases and similar statutes may be used in aid of interpretation of a Navajo
statute.""
Many tribes explicitly adopt state laws to address particular issues and to fill
gaps in tribal codes."os A quick survey of tribal court opinions reveals that
tribal judges cite to state and federal court opinions as persuasive authority in
many instances, including disputes exclusively between members.'0 6 In one
99. See Cedar Unified Sch. Dist. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm'n, No. SC-CV-53-06,
25-26 (Navajo Nov. 21, 2007) (VersusLaw) [subscription only] (stating that "Navajo law
recognizes the importance of contracts, and this Court applies the principle that words are
sacred and never frivolous" when discussing a choice of law provision); Hopi Indian Credit
Assoc. v. Thomas, I Am. Tribal Law 353, 355 (Hopi Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing the general
rule that courts will look to the foreign law selected by the parties).
100. See Thomas, 1 Am. Tribal Law at 355 (recognizing the general rule that courts will look
to the foreign law selected by the parties).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 476(b) (2006).
102. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 104-05 (1993); Suzianne D. Painter-
Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the "Existing Indian Family"
Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the
Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 329, 353 (2008-2009).
103. See Thomas, 1 Am. Tribal Law at 357 (relying on FED. R. Civ. P.44.1 for direction on
what evidence is relevant to proving a Hopi custom or tradition).
104. Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Navajo Rptr. 108 (Navajo 1983).
105. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wiley, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (Colville Ct.
App. 1995) (discussing the tribal council's decision to adopt Washington state DUI law); In re
Estate of Komaquaptewa, 4 Am. Tribal Law 432, 437 (Hopi Ct. App. 2002) ("In the absence
of Hopi probate code this Court refers to Arizona law.").
106. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Sam, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6040,6042 (Colville
Ct. App. 1994) (looking to federal law for guidance on sentencing); Healy v. Mashantucket
Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-EA-97-132,1 36 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Apr. 8,
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case, the Colville Confederated Tribes' Court of Appeals explicitly refused to
apply a Washington state statute because the tribal council's choice-of-law
code did not allow for it.' 7 Although the tribal court discounted reference to
state statutory law, it did rely on state and federal common law to shape the
substantive and procedural aspects of the matter before the court.'o
Additionally, scholars have discovered that tribal courts apply Anglo-
American concepts, if not state or federal law explicitly, when adjudicating
disputes involving nonmembers - the very group the Supreme Court believes
needs protection from tribal law. In Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life
of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, Dean Newton observed that tribal courts
commonly weave Western legal principles into their own customs and
norms.'09 Likewise, in his article Toward a Theory of Intertribal and
Intratribal Common Law, Professor Matthew Fletcher persuasively argues that
tribal courts often apply substantive common law that arises out of an Anglo-
American legal construct to nonmembers."o He observes that "it is unusual
to find a tribal court decision involving nonmembers that would depart in a
radical manner from the way a state or federal court would decide the case."'
That is not to say that tribal law does not reflect tribal values and
customs.'12 Tribal courts are careful to assert the tribes' values when necessary
and appropriate. In Naize v. Naize,"' the Navajo Supreme Court declined to
apply New Mexico state law, instead relying on Navajo traditions to determine
an appropriate spousal-maintenance award.1' Although state law allowed for
spousal maintenance to be paid over time, the supreme court reversed a lower
court holding that required the husband to supply coal and firewood
throughout his former wife's life. The court explained,
1999) (VersusLaw) [subscription only] (relying on state and federal law definitions of due
process).
107. Seymour v. Colville Confederated Tribes, Case No. AP94-004 36-37 (Colville Ct.
App. 1995) (VersusLaw) [subscription only].
108. Id. 37.
109. Newton, supra note 24, at 315-16.
110. Fletcher, supra note 24, at 726.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Chitimacha Hous. Auth. v. Martin, No. CV-93-0006, IT 61, 64 (Chitimacha
Ct. App. 1994) (VersusLaw) [subscription only] (citing CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES
OF JUSTICE tit. 4, § 501 (a)(3)); In re Estate ofKomaquaptewa, 4 Am. Tribal Law 432,440 (Hopi
Ct. App. 2002).
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There is a principle of finality in Navajo customary divorce, and
the principle of restoring harmony in the community by quickly
and finally breaking ties so the community can soon return to
normal is one which is common-sense. To permit a former spouse
to keep such ties that she or he may be said to be lurking behind the
hogan waiting to take a portion of the corn harvest is unthinkable,
since each spouse returns to his or her own family after the divorce.
Each former spouse should return home after making the break and
disturb others no more.'"5
But these values are not impossible to ascertain. Like the Navajo court quoted
above, tribal judges will define in their opinions the underlying tribal values
that are influencing the interpretation and application of the law." 6
Additionally, some tribal codes will allow for "evidence" of the tribes'
traditions and values to be obtained through access to identified tribal elders
or other witnesses."' Tribal judges will seek to discover relevant customs and
traditions through many of the same mechanisms as their state court
counterparts. For example, in Hopi Indian Credit Association v. Thomas, the
Hopi tribal court was required to apply any relevant Hopi custom or
115. Id. 33; see also Navajo Transp. Servs. v. Schroeder, No. SC-CV-44-06 (Navajo Apr.
30,2007) (VersusLaw) [subscription only]. The Navajo Supreme Court admonished the lower
court for blindly applying the personal jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts. The court
pointed out that applying the federal standard ignored the clear public policy of the Navajo
Nation regarding the sale of liquor and its effects within reservation borders and failed to
understand that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not apply to the tribes.
The court instructed the lower court to determine if the long arm statute "is consistent with
Navajo concepts of fairness embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Navajo Bill of Rights."
The court went on to note that "the Navajo concept of due process is unique, in that it applies
concepts of fairness consistent with Navajo values." Id. f 21, 23.
116. Naize, $ 32-33 (VersusLaw) [subscription only]; see also Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of
Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 51 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990) (VersusLaw) [subscription
only] (describing the Navajo tradition of political liberty); Halona v. MacDonald, I Navajo
Rptr. 189, 195 (Navajo 1978).
117. See, e.g., Martin, 1 64 (VersusLaw) [subscription only] (citing CHITIMACHA
COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE tit. 4 § 501(a)(3)) (stating that "the Court may request the
testimony, as witnesses of the Court, of persons familiar with such custom and usage");
Hoffman v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6163,6172 n.14 (Colville Ct. App.
1997) (citing COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE § 3.4.04) (describing the mechanism for hearing of
evidence of customs and traditions); Dawes v. Yazzie (In re Estate of Belone), No. A-CV-0 I -
85, 24, 31 (Navajo July 10, 1987) (VersusLaw) [subscription only] (citing NAVAJO TRIBAL
CODE § 204(b)); Smith v. James, 2 Am. Tribal Law 319, 322-23 (Hopi Ct. App. 1999).
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tradition.' 18  The court acknowledged, however, that these concepts are
unwritten, making them "more difficult to define or apply."" 9 To address this
difficulty, the court required the party asserting the application of a tribal
custom to "plead and prove its existence and substance."l20 The court adopted
the procedures set out in Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governing the application of foreign law to guide the party's presentation - a
procedure not at all unfamiliar to state courts.121
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, tribal courts do not blindly apply
tribal law to every dispute before them. Like their state court counterparts,
tribal courts are guided by choice-of-law rules. Moreover, in many instances,
tribal courts apply foreign law directly or allow Anglo-American legal
principles to influence their interpretation of tribal law. When uncodified
tribal values, customs, or traditions are necessary to the analysis, tribal courts,
like state and federal courts, have a mechanism for ascertaining them. Thus,
contrary to Justice Souter's concurrence in Hicks, tribal laws are neither
undecipherable nor wholly foreign to non-Indians, nonmembers, or state court
judges.
The Supreme Court's approach to tribes' jurisdiction and its undisguised
mistrust of tribal law appears to have influenced how state courts approach
jurisdiction when tribal interests are implicated. In the tribal context, state
courts have presumed that the existence of adjudicativejurisdiction brings with
it legislative jurisdiction and, consequently, the application of state law.122
State courts have failed to maintain the distinction between adjudicative and
legislative jurisdiction that exists outside the tribal context.'23 This approach
has been aided by the Supreme Court's treatment of tribal law as not only
foreign but of questionable legitimacy.'24 The Court's stated assumptions
118. 1 Am. Tribal Law 353, 356 (Hopi Ct. App. 1998).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 357.
121. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P.44.1 ("A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country's law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the
court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.").
122. See infra notes 190-209 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 190-209 and accompanying text.
124. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (quoting Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (asserting that non-Indians should not be subject to
tribal laws because it would "impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code
... which judges them by a standard made by others, and not for them ... [and] tries them, not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a
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about tribal law are more than just misguided - they are insidious. They serve
to undermine and segregate tribal law as "other" and, as a result, provide state
courts with implicit permission to ignore it. As the next section reveals, this
misguided approach has dangerous consequences when state and tribal courts'
jurisdiction overlaps.
II. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Tribal and state court jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive. State courts
may have concurrent civil jurisdiction with tribal courts in two contexts: the
first is through congressional mandate and the second is through recognition
of the overlapping sovereignty of the tribes and the states.12 5 In the first
instance, Congress accounted for the distinction between adjudicative and
legislative jurisdiction, and even sometimes directly addressed choice-of-law
questions, both anticipating and, in some instances, mandating the application
of tribal law in state courts.'26
In the absence of congressional direction, however, when state courts have
assumed concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts, they have failed to even
question the scope of their legislative jurisdiction. 127 State courts assume that
the grant of adjudicative jurisdiction carries with it legislative jurisdiction,
ignoring Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the reach of states' authority
into Indian Country.128  Indian law demands that before applying state
substantive law or even state choice-of-law rules, state courts must first
determine whether they have such authority, and must subsequently determine
whether those laws or rules are preempted by federal Indian law.129 The
preemption question is more than academic - it goes directly to issues of tribal
sovereignty.
different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect
conception")).
125. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505,67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2006), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)) (commonly referred
to as Public Law 280); Wold II, 476 U.S. 877, 884-85 (1986) (recognizing that North Dakota
could assume jurisdiction independent of congressional enactment).
126. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), (c).
127. See infra notes 190-209 and accompanying text.
128. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1983) (citations
omitted).
129. See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)
(discussing preemption as an independent barrier to state jurisdiction).
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A. Statutory Grant ofAdjudicative and Legislative Jurisdiction
Congress granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction over disputes
originating in Indian Country through a variety of statutes, appropriately
distinguishing adjudicative jurisdiction from legislative jurisdiction and
legislative jurisdiction from choice-of-law inquiries.13 o In each of these
statutes, Congress granted state courts adjudicative jurisdiction and, in certain
circumstances, legislative jurisdiction, but it did not automatically assume that
the state courts could or would apply forum law."' Indeed, in some instances
Congress mandated the application of tribal law in state courts.13 2 Congress
did not relegate tribal laws to tribal courts, but instead included them as part
of the delivery of justice in the state courts.
Public Law 280, the most prominent of these statutes, provides a potent
example of a congressional authorization.'33 It empowers some states to
130. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 233 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), (c).
131. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 233; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360(a), (c).
132. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 233; 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
133. While Public Law 280 is among the most comprehensive statutes, it does not provide
the only basis for concurrent jurisdiction. Some states have also assumed jurisdiction pursuant
to other federal laws or treaty provisions. In separate statutes, Congress granted jurisdiction to
New York, Kansas, and North Dakota. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2006) (New York); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3243 (2006) (Kansas); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota). Congress
also granted concurrent civil jurisdiction to Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine. E.g., 25
U.S.C. § 233 (Connecticut); 25 U.S.C. § 1708(a) (2006) (Rhode Island); 25 U.S.C. § 1725(a)
(2006) (Maine). The Indian Child Welfare Act provides limited jurisdiction to state courts over
the adoption and custody of Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006). While the
Act provides a placement-priorities list for state courts to follow, the tribes are authorized to
override that list and the state courts are directed to apply the tribal law. Id. § 1915(c). The
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) requires states and tribes to enter compacts to establish
the scope and conduct of Indian gaming. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006). The law allows the
two sovereigns to allocate jurisdiction between the tribe and the state, and to create a choice-of-
law rule for disputes not controlled by an IGRA provision. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C); see also
Diepenbrock v. Merkel, 97 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that the gaming
compact provided the tribe with exclusive jurisdiction over certain disputes). These compacts
provide another avenue for state courts to assume jurisdiction over disputes in Indian Country
and, in some instances, for the state courts to apply tribal law. See Cossey v. Cherokee Nation
Enters., 212 P.3d 447, 464-65 (Okla. 2009). Part 8(C) of the compact recognizes that a
violation of tribal law could be a basis for suit, implicitly acknowledging that state courts may
be required to apply tribal law. Unfortunately, state and tribal governments have not always
been careful about identifying a choice-of-law rule. See Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola,
230 P.3d 488, 493 n.17 (Okla. 2009). The choice-of-law issue in IGRA compacts is morefar-
reaching than simply answering the question ofwhat law should be applied. In instances where
the tribe has agreed to the application of state law, some state courts have found that such
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assume jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising in Indian Country.134
The law withdrew federal criminal jurisdiction from reservations in six states
and authorized those states to assume both criminal and civil jurisdiction over
activities occurring in Indian Country.'35 For the remaining states, Public Law
280 established a mechanism to assume the same type of jurisdiction by
enacting affirmative legislation accepting authority over reservation Indians."'
To date, there are sixteen states that have assumed civil jurisdiction over
some or all civil cases arising in Indian Country pursuant to the law.137
Congress was silent, however, as to the tribes' ability to continue to hear civil
cases, and subsequent case law established that tribal courts' jurisdiction
remained."' As a result, in these states, state and tribal courts share
jurisdiction over civil disputes arising in Indian Country, creating a potential
conflict-of-law scenario.139
Although Public Law 280 granted adjudicative jurisdiction, Congress did
not authorize states to automatically apply their own law to the disputes.14 0
Public Law 280 contains two potential limitations to the application of state
law to a dispute: the absence of state legislative jurisdiction and the existence
agreement equals a waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity. See Bradley v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 67 P.3d 306, 308, 311-12 (Mont. 2003) (holding that the tribe had waived its sovereign
immunity and could be sued in state court by agreeing to state law and to state court jurisdiction
in a standard construction-contract provision on choice of law and venue).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
136. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1324 (2006). In 1968, Congress made assumptions of
jurisdiction subject to Indian consent - something that did not exist in the original statute. Act
of Apr. 11, 1968, sec. 401-02, Pub. L. Nos. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78. Only one state (Utah) has
assumed such jurisdiction, but as of yet, no tribe in Utah has consented. UTAH CODE ANN. §§
9-9-201 to -213 (2009).
137. The original and amended statute granted jurisdiction to California, Minnesota (except
the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except Warm Springs Reservation), Wisconsin
(except Menominee Reservation), and eventually Alaska. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28 U.S.C. §
1360(a). Ten states then assumed some type of jurisdiction: "Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington." Samuel E. Ennis,
Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An
Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REv. 553, 562 n.48 (2009).
138. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 560-61 (citations omitted) (describing the "nearly
unanimous view" that Public Law 280 did not disturb the tribal jurisdiction); see also Vanessa
J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280,
47 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1658, 1671 (1998).
139. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 563-64 (citations omitted).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (providing for adjudicativejurisdiction over criminal conduct);
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (providing for adjudicative jurisdiction over civil disputes).
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of a non-conflicting tribal law. In § 1360(a), Congress provided a general
grant of legislative jurisdiction when it declared that "those civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State." 4' The statute has been narrowly construed to
grant states the authority to apply state civil laws to "private civil litigation
involving reservation Indians in state court," but not to grant general civil
regulatory authority.142 It has been further refined by other federal statutes,
such as the Indian Child Welfare Act, that place additional limitations on state
regulatory authority.143
After the state court determines that it has legislative jurisdiction, a separate
question arises regarding what law applies in a civil dispute between private
parties. While Congress authorized the application of tribal law in § 1360(a),
it addressed separately whether state courts could apply state law. In §
1360(c), Congress required state courts to give full force and effect to tribal
ordinances or customs not in conflict with applicable state law when deciding
civil disputes.'" This latter section allows for the application of tribal law in
state courts, even though the earlier section allowed for state regulatory
jurisdiction to extend into Indian Country.14 5
Congress adhered to several guiding principles in Public Law 280. First,
Congress affirmed that, absent congressional authorization, state courts were
not free to apply state law to disputes arising in Indian Country. 4 6 Second,
Congress acknowledged that a state's power to hear a dispute (adjudicative
jurisdiction) is distinct from its authority to apply the forum's law to the
dispute (legislative jurisdiction). 147 Third, Congress recognized that the power
to apply state law did not answer the choice-of-law question. As a result,
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
142. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 383-85 & n.10 (1976).
143. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 191 1(a)-(b), 1915(c) (2006).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
145. See Estate of Cross, 891 P.2d 26, 29 (Wash. 1995); Gary C. Randall & Katti Telstad,
Community Property Rules or American Indian Tribal Law - Which Prevails?, 31 IDAHO L.
REV. 1071, 1076-77 (1995).
146. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Supreme Court made clear
that absent congressional authorization, the states lacked authority over the tribes and their land.
Id. at 595 ("It has been shown that the treaties and laws referred to come within the due exercise
of the constitutional powers of the federal government; that they remain in full force, and
consequently must be considered as the supreme laws of the land.").
147. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text (discussing the separate recognition of
adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction as well as choice of law).
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Congress included an explicit choice-of-law provision where it anticipated that
state court judges would ascertain and, when appropriate, utilize the law of the
affected tribe.148 Unfortunately, as discussed below, state courts have not
adhered to the same principles when assuming jurisdiction independent of
statutory authority.
B. Extra-Statutory Assumption ofAdjudicative and Legislative Jurisdiction
1. Adjudicative Jurisdiction
The distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction
disappears when state courts assume concurrent adjudicativejurisdiction in the
absence of a specific congressional enactment. Without analysis, state courts
have blindly applied state law to disputes arising in Indian Country, never
questioning whether they have the authority to do so. But the assumption of
legislative jurisdiction and the subsequent application of state law contradict
well-established Indian law principles and Supreme Court precedent. State
courts ignore the analytical framework, used both in and outside Indian law,
that divides the jurisdictional question into two distinct categories:
adjudicative and legislative. This analytical deficit and its concomitant effect
on tribal sovereignty is exacerbated by the state courts' expansive view of their
adjudicative authority.
In Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, p.C., 149 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that states may have
adjudicative jurisdiction over certain matters involving tribes and their
members independent of congressional enactments.'o The Court
acknowledged that states had assumed concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction
over suits by tribal members against non-Indians arising in Indian Country and
jurisdiction over suits between Indians arising outside of Indian Country.'
The Court also reaffirmed, however, that the assertion of state power must be
balanced with the federal government's and tribes' interest in promoting tribal
self-government.152
Conscious of the importance of protecting tribal sovereignty, the Wold II
Court questioned North Dakota's attempt to conflate adjudicative and
148. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
149. 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (Woldl).
150. Id. at 144-45 (describing North Dakota's "expansive view of the scope of state-court
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country" before the enactment of Public Law 280).
151. Id. at 148.
152. Id. at 148-49; see also Wold II, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
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legislative jurisdiction.15 In WoldII, North Dakota had conditioned the tribe's
access to the state courts on the tribe's acquiescence to the application of state
civil law in all state court civil actions.'54 The Supreme Court rejected this
provision, declaring it antithetical to the federal government's and tribe's
interest in Indian sovereignty.'
This provision plainly provides that state law will generally control,
however, and will merely be supplemented by nonconflicting
Indian ordinances or customs, even in cases that arise on the
reservation, that involve only Indians, and that concern subjects
that are within the jurisdiction of the tribal court. This result
simply cannot be reconciled with Congress' jealous regard for
Indian self-governance.' 56
The Court concluded that North Dakota could not condition access to state
courts on the tribe's waiver of application of its laws.' Implicit in the Court's
holding is the understanding that state courts may, in some instances, have
adjudicative jurisdiction but lack the authority to apply state law to the
underlying dispute.
The Wold II Court's pronouncement regarding the scope of a state's
legislative jurisdiction is hardly groundbreaking. One hundred and fifty years
earlier, the Court in Worcester v. Georgia held that Georgia did not have the
authority to impose its laws within the Cherokee tribal territory in the absence
of congressional consent or "the assent of the Cherokees themselves."15 The
Supreme Court's statement was guided by two axioms, both relevant to the
current discussion: first, that the Constitution delegated authority over Indian
matters to the federal government and not to the states, and second, that tribes
have a significant interest in self-government free from state interference.'
The Court affirmed these basic principles in Williams v. Lee,160 a case
involving a state court's adjudicative jurisdiction over a dispute between a
non-Indian and a tribal member that occurred on the reservation.' 61 Pursuant
to Williams, state courts are not free to assume adjudicative jurisdiction absent
153. WoldII, 476 U.S. at 890.
154. Id. at 889-90.
155. Id. at 890.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
159. Id. at 561-62.
160. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
161. Id. at 217-18.
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congressional or tribal consent if "the state action infringe[s] on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 6 2 While
the Court's opinion focuses on the scope of the Arizona state courts'
adjudicative jurisdiction, the Court did, in a limited fashion, address the scope
of a state's legislative jurisdiction. The Court declared that "the States have
no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation." 6 3
State courts have varied in their adherence to these principles. Citing Wold
I and Williams, state courts have assumed adjudicative jurisdiction
concurrently with tribal courts in a variety of circumstances, some of which are
of questionable validity.'" For example, although it is generally understood
that states lack the authority to adjudicate disputes between Indians that occur
in Indian Country, not all state courts have followed this rule. In Wildcatt v.
Smith,16 5 a North Carolina state court asserted jurisdiction over a domestic-
relations matter involving two members of the Eastern Band of the Cherokee
Indians, both of whom resided on the reservation.'" Although North Carolina
had not assumed jurisdiction over such suits pursuant to Public Law 280, the
court still entered a default judgment for child support against the father.'6 1
The court reasoned that assumption of subject matter jurisdiction did not
unduly infringe on the tribe's sovereignty because, at the time the case was
decided, the tribe lacked a court system where the dispute could be heard.'6 1
Underlying this conclusion, of course, was the court's assumption that a
Western-style court system was the only appropriate mechanism for resolving
the dispute.
State courts have also assumed jurisdiction when the conduct occurred on
the reservation between tribal members and nonmember Indians, even though
it is far from settled whether state courts have such authority."' The case
described in the introduction provides an example of this problem. As noted
earlier, in Wacondo, two Indians from one pueblo sued an Indian from a
162. Id. at 220.
163. Id.
164. See Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276, 278 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
165. 316 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
166. Id. at 872, 875.
167. Id. at 872, 875, 877-78.
168. Id. at 877.
169. After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), it
is unclear whether the appropriate jurisdictional rules in Indian Country are guided by the
Indian/non-Indian distinction or whether the distinction is between members and nonmembers.
Compare Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160-61 (1980), with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978).
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different pueblo in New Mexico state court for injuries that occurred in Indian
Country. 170 Citing Wold I, the New Mexico state court found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, although it was careful to note that
it was not suggesting that the Jemez tribal court lacked jurisdiction, but only
that the state court was another appropriate forum."'
State courts easily find concurrent jurisdiction when the dispute involves a
non-Indian or when it includes some off-reservation conduct.172 To determine
if the assumption of jurisdiction is appropriate in these instances, state courts
apply the Williams "infringement test," asking whether the assumption of
jurisdiction would unduly infringe on the tribe's ability to make its own laws
and be governed by them.17 ' The courts vary in their application of the
Williams test; some courts properly focus on how state action would affect the
tribe, 17 4 while others seem to focus instead on the states' interests.17 1
For example, in Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., the state court was asked
to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an employment-contract
dispute between a tribal enterprise owned and operated on the reservation that
also had off-reservation contacts and a non-Indian employee.' 6  After
170. Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276, 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
171. Id. at 278,280 n.3.
172. See, e.g., State Sec., Inc. v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786, 788 (N.M. 1973) (noting that
"[p]owers not reserved to Indians for their exclusive jurisdiction [include] ... jurisdiction to try
suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts"); Langdeau v. Langdeau, 751 N.W.2d 722,
724-30 (S.D. 2008) (acknowledging concurrent state courtjurisdiction over divorce proceedings
between two enrolled members of the same tribe when one party lives off-reservation and also
when one party to the divorce is non-Indian); Rolette Cnty. Soc. Serv. Bd. v. B.E., 697 N.W.2d
333, 335 (N.D. 2005).
173. Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591,603 (N.M. 2009); Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.2d 141,
144 (S.D. 1991).
174. Rodriguez v. Wong, 82 P.3d 263, 266-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). At least one state
court has adopted a hybrid test that uses the Montana exceptions to determine whether the
assumption of state court jurisdiction would infringe on tribal sovereignty. In Rodriguez, a
Washington state court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an employment
dispute involving a non-Indian employee of the Muckleshoot Gaming Commission, a
government subdivision of the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe. Id. at 265, 267-68. The court
reasoned that because the tribal court had jurisdiction over the matter under both exceptions
identified in Montana and had "exercised its authority to regulate its relationship with its
gaming employees, the state courts tacked jurisdiction." Id. at 266-67. Under this test, the state
courts could only exercise jurisdiction when the tribal court lacked it, essentially removing the
possibility of concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction.
175. See, e.g., Rolette, 697 N.W.2d at 337; Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 924 P.2d 372,
374-75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
176. Maxa, 924 P.2d at 372-73.
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identifying the "infringement test" as the proper vehicle for analyzing the
issue, the court focused on the state's interest in protecting parties to
contracts.'77 The state court opined that the assumption of jurisdiction over
such contracts is not only in the state's interest, but is in the best of interests
of both the non-Indian and the tribe.'
When, as here, a dispute does not clearly arise either on or off a
reservation, the essential question is whether state assumption of
jurisdiction would interfere with reservation self-government. The
State has an interest in protecting parties to contracts from
arbitrariness in enforcement.179
The court's reasoning appears to rest on the premise that tribal courts would
be unable or unwilling to protect the parties' contract rights. Presumably, the
"protection" offered by the state courts would require not only access to state
courts but also application of state laws.
In some instances, state courts simply manufacture jurisdiction. The
Oklahoma state courts have found the mere existence of a gaming compact
sufficient to confer concurrent jurisdiction, even when the gaming contract
itself does not allow for it.' In Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was asked to determine whether, under the tribal-
gaming compact, the state courts could adjudicate a tort claim between a non-
Indian patron and the casino and tribe."' Article 9 of the gaming compact
stated that "[t]his compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil
adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction." 82 Despite this language and the lack of
clarity regarding the existence of state adjudicative jurisdiction before the
compact was created,' the court concluded that because the compact had
allowed patrons to sue for injuries, the tribe had implicitly consented to suit in
state, federal or tribal court.'" The court reasoned that "[n]othing in the
compact provides that patron tort claims are to be adjudicated only in tribal
177. Id. at 374.
178. Id. at 375.
179. Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
180. Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, 230 P.3d 488, 493-96 (Okla. 2009); Cossey v.
Cherokee Nation Enters., 212 P.3d 447, 453 (Okla. 2009).
181. Griffith, 230 P.3d at 489.
182. Id. at 496.
183. Cossey, 212 P.3d at 453 (acknowledging that Oklahoma had not assumed jurisdiction
under Public Law 280).
184. Grifith, 230 P.3d at 496.
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court. Had that been the intent of the tribes and the state, the simple words 'in
tribal court only' could have been included in the compact."'
The state courts' willingness to assume concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction
is troubling on several fronts. First, given that tribal jurisdiction is so closely
tied to the tribes' sovereignty interest, it is hard to imagine that the state
courts' assumption of concurrent jurisdiction does not, by definition, infringe
on the tribes' sovereignty interests.'18  While the Supreme Court has required
parties to exhaust their tribal remedies before accessing the federal courts,"'
state courts have not uniformly adopted a similar approach.'88 Second, the
effect on tribal sovereignty interests is exacerbated by the state courts' failure
to consider and apply tribal law where necessary.' Currently, when state
courts assume concurrent jurisdiction, they summarily strip the tribes of both
the ability to hear the case and to have their law applied to the underlying
dispute.
2. Legislative Jurisdiction
As the preceding discussion illustrates, state courts assume concurrent
adjudicative jurisdiction in a significant number of circumstances. In these
instances, both the tribal and state courts have authority to enter binding
judgments against the parties. Because a tribe's adjudicative and legislative
jurisdiction are essentially coextensive, tribal law would also be applicable to
the underlying dispute.'90 But the converse is not necessarily true; state courts
cannot assume that if they have adjudicative jurisdiction, they automatically
have legislative jurisdiction."' Yet state courts routinely ignore the difference
between legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction in the tribal context.'92 The
conflation of adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction creates an anomaly in
185. Id.
186. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 340-41
(2008).
187. E.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins.
Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
188. See, e.g., Meyer & Assocs. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So.2d 446,450 (La. 2008);
Astorgav. Wing, 118 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Michael Minnis & Assocs. v. Kaw
Nation, 90 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003).
189. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
190. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 436, 453 (1997).
191. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
192. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So.2d 1160, 1169 (Fla. 2006) (deciding
to apply Indiana law in a case properly in Florida court); Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546, 560
(Va. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the law of the Virgin Islands).
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federal Indian law: state courts assume greater regulatory power in the absence
of congressional mandate than what Congress has provided in the various
statutes regulating the relationships between the states and the tribes.'93 While
Congress placed limits on the application of state law to disputes arising in
Indian Country,194 state courts acting independently of congressional
enactment perceive no similar limitations. In fact, a review of state court cases
finds no decision in which the state court assumed concurrent adjudicative
jurisdiction but also found that it lacked the authority to apply its laws to the
underlying dispute.
While state courts uniformly fail to explore limitations to their legislative
jurisdiction, some state courts have at least acknowledged the potential
application of tribal law.'95 In Tempest Recovery Services, Inc. v. Belone, a
creditor repossessed a car located on the reservation and owned by a member
of the Navajo tribe.1 96 The creditor then brought a breach-of-contract claim in
New Mexico state court and the defendant brought a counterclaim for breach
of the peace under Navajo law.197 In contrast to New Mexico law, which
allowed a creditor to engage in self-help, Navajo law required a creditor to first
obtain permission, either from the debtor or the courts, before repossessing
property - something Tempest had failed to do.'98 While the New Mexico
Supreme Court concluded that the state court could properly assert jurisdiction
over both the plaintiff s claim and the defendant's counterclaim, it remanded
to the lower court to consider the choice-of-law question.1 99
Likewise, in Jim v. CITFinancial Services Corp., the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the law governing a contract dispute between a member of
Navajo Nation and a nonmember "must be resolved in the same fashion as any
other involving contract."2 00 The court directed the trial court to examine the
193. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory and choice-
of-law limitations in federal statutes).
194. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory and choice-
of-law limitations in federal statutes).
195. See, e.g., Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 71 (N.M. 2003); Jim
v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 553 P.2d 751, 753 (N.M. 1975); Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus.
v. Emp. Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 740, 741-42 (Or. 1986) (considering tribal law, but
concluding that based on all the facts, the parties intended Oregon law to apply); Lewis v. Sac
& Fox Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 896 P.2d 503, 512-14 (Okla. 1994) (rejecting an argument
that tribal law should apply to resolve the dispute); see also Pearson, supra note 2, at 717 n. 124.
196. Belone, 74 P.3d at 68.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 68-69.
199. Id. at 71-72.
200. Jim, 533 P.2d at 753.
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provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code applicable to secured transactions
and choice of law to determine whether Navajo or state law applied to the
suit.20' Significantly, in stating that "[a] forum state need not subordinate its
own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state,"202 the court
implicitly acknowledged that the public-policy exception may be a basis for
rejecting the application of Navajo law.
Some commentators have advocated this approach, encouraging state courts
to incorporate tribal law into their choice-of-law analysis. To be sure, a state
court's use of its choice-of-law rules at least recognizes the legitimacy of tribal
law. The results, however, are far from predictable, and the inherent forum
bias of the rules make it unlikely that tribal law will be applied.203 As the
court's statement in Jim illustrates, under traditional choice-of-law rules, state
courts are still free to apply the forum law, another state's law, or even reject
the application of tribal law based on the state's public-policy exception.20
While a state court's passing reference to tribal law is perhaps better than the
state court ignoring tribal law altogether, the traditional choice-of-law analysis
gives insufficient weight to the tribal and federal interest at stake in a dispute
over which tribal courts have jurisdiction.20 5
But the state court's application of its choice-of-law rules is more
problematic than forum bias. State courts assume that there is a choice - that
is, they assume that state law can be applied to the underlying dispute. State
courts have conflated adjudicative jurisdiction with legislative jurisdiction by
assuming that the authority to adjudicate the dispute brings with it the absolute
201. Id.
202. Id. at 752.
203. Choice of law rules contain immense flexibility and are often forum-biased. See Jackie
Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice ofLaw, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 881, 898-99 (2006) ("There is no uniform choice of law method currently used by state
courts. Instead, courts employ a patchwork of theories developed over the last century to arrive
at their decisions. ... [T]he flexibility inherent in all the methods allow[s] a court to choose a
law it deem[s] most appropriate in a given situation even if that mean[s] a court could (and
perhaps would) always choose the forum state's law.") (citing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 77 (2d ed. 1995)). Pursuant to each of these theories, state courts were free to ignore
foreign law. BRILMAYER, supra, at 77-79. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that
there is no constitutional compulsion for "a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its
own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." Pac.
Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); see also Baker v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). Thus, in most instances, a state court's decision to
apply foreign law is wholly discretionary.
204. See Jim, 533 P.2d at 752.
205. See Gardina, supra note 203, at 898-900.
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authority to apply state law. Congress recognized the distinction in its grant
ofjurisdiction to state courts over disputes arising in Indian Country in statutes
like Public Law 280.206 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the distinction
both inside and outside the tribal context.20' In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court
explicitly noted the necessity of first determining legislative jurisdiction.20 8
And, outside the tribal context, state courts have properly separated
adjudicative jurisdiction from legislative jurisdiction, recognizing that they are
distinct analyses. 209 Yet, oddly, when tribal matters are involved, and in the
absence of congressional direction - when the state's authority is arguably at
its lowest ebb - state courts fail to make this distinction.
III. Preemption: A Framework for Applying Tribal Law in State Courts
When state courts acquire concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction independent
of a federal statute, such as through common law or by agreement, this article
contends that Supreme Court jurisprudence directs state courts to apply the
whole law of the tribe, including tribal choice-of-law provisions. A guiding
principle emerges from this proposition: if a tribe has legislative jurisdiction
over the dispute, tribal law must ordinarily be applied. In these instances, a
state's laws, including its choice-of-law rules, are preempted by federal
common law. In short, states lack legislative jurisdiction. Unfortunately, state
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
207. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815 (1985) (distinguishing between
adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction in the state courts); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 373-
74 (2001).
208. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 373-74 ("And the second problem is that withoutfirst determining
whether the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction, it is impossible to know which 'immunity
defenses' the federal court is supposed to consider. The tribe's law on this subject need not be
the same as the State's; indeed, the tribe may decide (as did the common law until relatively
recently) that there is no immunity defense whatever without a warrant."); see also Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 436 (1997), where the Court clearly separated the concepts of legislative
and adjudicative jurisdiction, stating that they "express no view on the governing law or proper
forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation." Id. at 442 (emphasis
supplied).
209. State ex rel. Miller v. Baxter Chrysler Plymouth, 456 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Iowa 1990)
("We note in this regard, however, that subject matter jurisdiction should not be confused with
legislative jurisdiction, i.e., whether a state may constitutionally apply the law of the forum in
adjudicating the validity of transactions which took place in whole or in part in another
jurisdiction, or whether a state's choice of law rules permit application of its laws to a
transaction which occurred in whole or in part outside of its borders.") (citation omitted); see
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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courts have simply ignored the preemption analysis when addressing their
legislative jurisdiction in private litigation affecting tribes and tribal members.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Supreme Court recognized
that there are "two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members." 21 0 The first is
whether the employment of state law "unlawfully infringe[s] 'on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 2 1  The
second, and the one relevant to the discussion, is when the assertion of such
authority is preempted by federal law.2 12 State courts appear only to address
the first obstacle when considering the scope of their jurisdiction in the civil
litigation context, ignoring the possibility that the application of state law to
a dispute within the tribes' jurisdiction may be preempted by federal law.
The preemption analysis in the Indian law context is slightly different than
the one traditionally employed by the courts.213 Ordinarily, state law is
presumed to apply unless it is established that Congress clearly intended to
preempt state law.214 The opposite presumption is at work in the Indian law
context; state jurisdiction in Indian Country is presumed lacking.' To
overcome the presumption, the state's regulatory interests216 must be balanced
against the federal and tribal interests in promoting tribal sovereignty.2 17
210. 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); see also Wold II, 476 U.S. 877, 884 (1986) ("Our cases
reveal a 'trend .. . away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a[n independent] bar
to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption."') (alteration in original).
211. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
212. Id.
213. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 ("The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it
generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of
preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law.").
214. See id.
215. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124-25 (1993).
216. See WoldII, 476 U.S. 877, 884 (1986); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362 (2001)
("That is not to say that States may exert the same degree of regulatory authority within a
reservation as they do without. To the contrary,... [there must be] 'an accommodation between
the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those the State,
on the other."').
217. See WoldII, 476 U.S. at 884 ("Yet considerations of tribal sovereignty, and the federal
interests in promoting Indian self-governance and autonomy, if not of themselves sufficient to
'pre-empt' state regulation, nevertheless form an important backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."); see also Proclamation No. 7500, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,641 (Nov. 12, 2001) ("We will protect and honor tribal sovereignty and help to
stimulate economic development in reservation communities."); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) ("[We] recognize[] the right of Indian tribes to self-
government and support[] tribal sovereignty and self-determination."); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143
No. 1] 33
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
Under this analysis, the Court has recognized that "[w]hen on-reservation
conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally
inapplicable."218 While the scope of the state's legislative authority is arguably
stronger when non-Indians are involved, the Court nonetheless recognized that
there are circumstances in which state law would be preempted.2 19
The Court has preempted a number of state laws that affected non-Indians
in Indian Country after determining that the application of state law would
impair federal goals articulated in legislation, regulations, and policies. 2 20 The
Court has been especially sensitive to supporting the federal goal of promoting
tribal sovereignty. 22' The Court recognized that granting the states concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing "would empower [states]
wholly to supplant tribal regulations" in direct contradiction to the federal
interests in promoting tribal self-government.222
The Court has similarly relied on the preemption analysis to preclude the
application of state law in private civil litigation.223 As previously discussed,
the Court in WoldlIrejected North Dakota's attempt to premise the tribe's and
tribal members' access to state courts on the application of state law to all
disputes.224 Citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court used the
preemption analysis to void the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme, reasoning
that, in certain instances, the states' interest in applying state law must give
way to the tribes' and federal government's interest in promoting tribal self-
221
government.
(there is "a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 155 (1980) (noting that federal statutes evidence "varying degrees [of] congressional
concern with fostering tribal self-government and economic development"); Queets Band of
Indians v. Washington, 765 F.2d 1399, 1407 n.6 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Here, the tribal interests are
an outgrowth of the federal policy toward self-determination, self-sufficiency and self-
government.").
218. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
219. Id. at 144-45.
220. Id. at 150-51; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338-39
(1983).
221. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 338-39.
222. Id. at 338, 341.
223. Wold II, 476 U.S 877, 888 (1986) (finding a North Dakota statute that required
application of state law to all disputes involving the tribe or tribal members preempted because
it was "unduly burdensome on the federal and tribal interests").
224. Id. at 889-90.
225. Id. at 890.
34 [ Vol. 35
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss1/8
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A ROADMAP 35
Using the preemption analysis, when states claim concurrent adjudicative
jurisdiction with tribal courts, there is a strong case to be made that state courts
must apply tribal law in a number of circumstances. First, because a tribe's
jurisdiction is directly linked to its sovereignty, the tribe's interest in
application of its laws is significant when it has jurisdiction over the dispute.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has directly linked tribal sovereignty
to the scope of the tribes' jurisdiction.2 26 Further, the Court recognized that the
tribes' jurisdiction and sovereignty interest authorize the regulation of non-
Indians in some circumstances.22 7 Under its Indian law jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has essentially limited tribal legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction to areas that are necessary to tribal self-government and the control
of internal relations.2 28 Thus, if the tribes have legislative jurisdiction, the
subject is one that is necessarily connected to the tribes' sovereignty interest.
It follows that a state interferes with tribal self-government when it attempts
to apply state law in an area in which the tribes have legislative jurisdiction.
Second, the federal government's interest in the application of tribal law is
also significant. There are a myriad of federal statutes evidencing the federal
government's support for tribal sovereignty, including the Indian
Reorganization Act, which specifically encouraged the creation of tribal
laws.229 Congress perceived the codification of tribal laws to be an important
step to promoting tribal sovereignty, enhancing tribal legitimacy, and enabling
tribal self-government. 230 Even in Public Law 280, which expanded state
adjudicative jurisdiction in civil cases, Congress mandated the application of
tribal law in the state courts in certain instances. 2 31 A state court's blind
application of state law would undermine these express federal goals.
The Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks supports the proposition that if the
tribe has legislative jurisdiction, tribal law should be applied to the dispute.232
The Court in Hicks addressed whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a
claim against a state official for conduct on tribal lands.233 The Supreme Court
reversed the tribal and lower federal courts' holdings that the tribal court had
jurisdiction, instead holding that the tribe lacked legislative jurisdiction to
226. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 334
(2008); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
227. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
228. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 332, 334-35 (citations omitted).
229. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006).
230. Id.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2006).
232. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362 (2001).
233. Id. at 356.
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regulate state officers' execution of process related to an off-reservation
violation of state law because such authority was "not essential to tribal self-
government." 234 Because the tribe lacked legislative jurisdiction (the ability
to apply its law to the state officials' conduct), it also lacked adjudicatory
jurisdiction to hear the suit.2 35
But Hicks could have originally brought suit in state court, thus raising the
question whether state or tribal law should apply to the dispute.236 If the tribe
had legislative jurisdiction, it would only be because matters of tribal self-
government and internal relations were implicated.2 37 While the Hicks Court
recognized that states may exert some regulatory authority within the
reservation borders,238 the Court also acknowledged that the states' authority
must yield to the interests of the tribes and federal government in tribal self-
23
government.239 In Hicks, the state's assertion of authority did not impair tribal
sovereignty because the tribe lacked legislative jurisdiction.24 0 It would follow
that if tribal legislative jurisdiction existed, tribal law would apply to the
dispute unless the state could establish an overwhelming interest that eclipsed
both federal government and tribal interests.
In the private litigation context, any state interest in the dispute is addressed
through the assumption of adjudicative jurisdiction. To provide the state court
with both adjudicative jurisdiction and the authority to apply its own law
would completely eclipse the recognized tribal sovereignty interests. It is also
important to emphasize that state interests are implicitly recognized in the
content of tribal law. As previously noted, tribal courts have incorporated
wide swaths of Anglo-American law into both tribal codes and tribal common
law.
A clear rule mandating the application of tribal law would also avoid the
consequences of forum shopping. Currently, a litigant can avoid the
application of an unattractive tribal law simply by filing in state court. While
the availability of concurrent jurisdiction allows a litigant to avoid the reach
of the tribal court, it should not allow the litigant to simultaneously avoid the
application of tribal law. If state courts were free to ignore tribal law, the
234. Id. at 364.
235. See id.
236. See WoldI, 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984) ("This Court, however, repeatedly has approved
the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even
when those claims arose in Indian country.").
237. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359.
238. Id. at 361.
239. Id. at 362.
240. Id. at 364.
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assertion of tribal sovereignty would be dependent upon a litigant's forum
selection. Requiring state courts to apply tribal law will ensure that tribal
authority is being recognized.even when the tribes' courts are not accessed.
Finally, allowing state courts to apply state law without limitation when the
courts are assuming jurisdiction in the absence of congressional enactment
simply defies well-established Indian law principles. Generally, Congress
regulates state authority over Indians and Indian Country. Yet, state courts
assuming jurisdiction independent of federal statute are adopting a broader
view of the scope of their authority than state courts that have authority
through statute. States subject to the confines of Public Law 280 must test the
application of state law against the mandates of § 1360(c).24 1 State courts
assuming jurisdiction outside of such enactments are not questioning the
application of state law at all. Such hubris ignores not just the preeminence of
federal authority in this area, but also fails to acknowledge tribal sovereignty.
Conclusion
To be sure, the analysis provided above assumes that there is tribal law that
is readily ascertainable. It encourages tribes to codify existing law and to
publish judicial decisions clarifying tribal norms and traditions. While some
may view this as advancing the goal of assimilation, it can also be viewed as
the advancement of Indian interests in the preservation of their laws, customs,
and traditions. State courts are assuming jurisdiction over a wide range of
disputes that could also be heard in the tribal courts. As tribal economic
development continues and tribes engage in relationships with non-Indians and
entities, the state courts will have the authority to assume jurisdiction in an
increasing number of cases. If state law is applied in each of these cases, tribal
laws will be relegated to disputes in which tribes have exclusive jurisdiction
or in which the litigants choose to file in tribal court. It is unlikely that
Congress or the Court will limit significantly states' adjudicative authority, but
states' legislative authority can be curbed through existing Indian law doctrine.
The preemption analysis outlined above provides a mechanism for promoting
tribal sovereignty and tribal self-government despite the growing jurisdictional
reach of the state courts.
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2006) ("Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may
possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force
and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.").
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